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Abstract
Modelling the incidence of self-employment has traditionally proved
problematic. Whilst the individual supply side characteristics of the
self-employed are well documented, the literature has largely neglected
(or misspeciﬁed) demand side aspects. In this paper we present results
from an econometric framework that allows us to separately, and si-
multaneously, model the supply and demand side characteristics that
determine employment outcomes. We show that whilst individual
characteristics are important determinants of the type of employment
contract that individuals hold, there are also important contract spe-
ciﬁc factors that inﬂuence the nature of the contract an individual is
employed under. Our results suggest that workers may be “captive” to
a particular type of employment because of the sector in which they
work, the number of hours they prefer to work and their ethnicity.
The results are based on a new estimator, the parameterised DOGEV
model, which allows for ordering and correlation in the observed al-
ternatives, and for captivity within an observed alternative.
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11 Introduction
Recent years have seen the self-employed emerge as an important group of
workers in many developed countries, accounting for sixteen percent of the
workforce in Australia, ten percent in Canada, nine per cent in the UK and
nine percent in the US in 1999 (Le 1999). The increasing proportion of self-
employed individuals in the labour force has led to an interest amongst econo-
mists and policy makers in the characteristics of the self-employed popula-
tion. Yet modelling the incidence of self-employment has traditionally proved
problematic. Whilst the individual supply side characteristics of the self-
employed are well documented, the literature to date, has largely neglected
(or misspeciﬁed) the demand side aspects that are important in determin-
ing self-employment. In this paper we present results from an econometric
framework that allows us to separately, and simultaneously, model the supply
and demand side characteristics that determine employment outcomes.
T h el i t e r a t u r ec o n c e r n i n gt h ep r o ﬁle of the self-employed has, in the main,
concentrated on looking at the characteristics of individuals who are self-
employed compared to those employed as ﬁxed wage workers. We extend
this approach by additionally considering workers employed on proﬁt related
pay (PRP) contracts. Such contracts allow some proportion of remuneration
to be conditional upon a measure of performance. These have become much
more commonplace in recent years and represent an interesting intermediate
contract between the earnings certainty of ﬁxed wage employment, and the
more uncertain earnings associated with self-employment.
If individuals were identical in terms of their ability, tastes and prefer-
1ences, and if there were no demand side rigidities in the labour market, in
the absence of capital constraints, one would anticipate a pooling equilibrium
with all workers ﬂocking to one of the three contacts (self-employment, PRP
or ﬁxed wage employment).1 In reality, there is a spectrum of ability, tastes
and preferences, labour market rigidities (such as hours constraints) do ex-
ist and workers are faced with capital constraints, which together imply a
separating equilibrium, with the expected utility of employment across each
of the three types of employment being equalized. This paper focusses on
the factors that determine the type of individual who is self-employed. We
investigate the possibility that individuals may not be strictly free to choose
their preferred type of employment, but may be “captive” to particular con-
tract types due to a number of demand side factors which characterise the
heterogeneity of employment contracts. Such factors here are: the nature
of the employment sector; the length of working week the contract implies;
and the individual’s ethnic origin. There are obvious welfare considerations
and associated policy issues if certain types of individual are being pushed
into risky self-employment due to labour market rigidities or discrimination,
rather than entering self-employment due to personal tastes and preferences.
The novelty of our approach is therefore twofold. Firstly, in contrast to
the existing research which assumes that those not in self-employment form
a homogeneous population, we set our analysis within a wider framework
by focusing on a range of employment contract types which are explored
collectively rather than in isolation.
1In what follows, we use the expressions ‘type of employment’ and ‘type of employment
contract’ interchangably.
2Secondly, we apply a new estimator, the Parameterised DOGEV model.
This model allows for ordering and correlation in the observed alternatives,
and for captivity within an observed alternative. Captivity to particular
employment types is likely due to labour market rigidities and may be char-
acterised by heterogeneity of the contract type. That is, we allow the choice
alternatives themselves to have observable heterogeneity which may poten-
tially capture individuals within a certain type of employment, separately
from the eﬀects of observable individual characteristics. Thus we are able
to determine the impact of supply side factors on the probability of the in-
dividual being employed under a given contract type whilst controlling for
demand side eﬀects.
We argue that the employment types are necessarily ordered by the ex-
tent of earnings uncertainty. Fixed wage employment, for example, implies
relatively stable pay. In contrast, a self-employed worker would expect to
experience greater earnings ﬂuctuations. PRP contracts, comprising an el-
ement of both ﬁxed and variable pay, provide an intermediate contract be-
tween these two extremes. In what follows, we presume that self-employment
is relatively more risky than PRP, which is itself relatively more risky than
ﬁxed wage employment. Our statistical model allows us to investigate, and
test, this hypothesis.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature to
date on the determinants of self-employment. Section 3 introduces our sta-
tistical framework and presents the Parameterised DOGEV model. Section
4 outlines the data used in the analysis. Section 5 discusses the ﬁndings from
the model and Section 6 summarises and presents some ﬁnal comments.
32B a c k g r o u n d
Recent years have heralded a resurgence of interest amongst both academics
and policy makers in the determinants of self-employment and its role as a
potential solution to unemployment and poverty (especially in times of eco-
nomic downturns). A number of approaches have been developed to explain
the supply and demand of self-employment, emphasizing to varying degrees
sociological, psychological and economic factors.
The basic economic argument is that individuals decide whether or not to
enter self-employment on the basis of the relative utilities on oﬀer. Such an
approach encapsulates unemployment push and pull factors, with displaced
workers being pushed or pulled into self-employment by supply side consid-
erations (Taylor 1996). Relative returns, however, are but one part of the
story. It has long been recognized that returns to self-employment are intrin-
sically riskier than the returns to salaried employment. An interesting issue
is what type of individual is attracted into self-employment?
The most recent research has focused on the attributes of the self-employed
in order to address the question “who are the self-employed?” focusing on
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity and family background (Le 1999).
In general, studies specify a reduced form Probit or Logit equation of self-
employment whereby the vector of explanatory variables contains a combi-
nation of personal and labour market characteristics.
Turning initially to personal characteristics, marital status has been in-
corporated into many empirical studies. As argued by Le (1999), marriage
is assumed in the economics literature, to represent stability and, as such,
4may provide a suitable background for “risky” self-employment. Moreover,
Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1990) and Bernhardt (1994) ﬁnd that having a
working spouse enhances the probability of self-employment - this may in-
clude ﬁnancial stability. Similarly, Schiller and Crewson (1997) ﬁnd evidence
of intra-couple risk pooling with a husband’s primary employment increas-
ing the probability that a wife will be observed in self-employment. Related
factors include the presence of children — individuals with young children, for
example, may be less likely to bear to risk associated with self-employment.
An individual’s age may also aﬀect his/her propensity to become self-
employed via a number of diﬀerent channels (see, Calvo and Wellisz 1980,
Kidd 1993). For instance, age may act as a proxy to capture the eﬀects of
an individual’s awareness, knowledge and experience in the labour market
thereby reﬂecting general human capital. Alternatively, as an individual be-
comes older, he/she may have accumulated the ﬁnancial resources required
for self-employment — hence age may capture eﬀects related to ﬁnancial, as
well as human, capital. Detailed analyses of the importance of capital con-
straints for the probability of becoming self-employed have been conducted
by Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998), Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) and Jo-
hansson (2000). In general, studies have reported a non-linear relationship
between self-employment and age (Rees and Shah 1986).
The role of ethnicity in determining the propensity to become self-employed
has also attracted a great deal of attention in the literature. The issue of
whether discrimination bars employment in certain sectors has been the sub-
ject of much debate (Hout and Rosen 2000). Rees and Shah (1986) ﬁnd
that non-white individuals in the U.K. have a lower propensity to become
5self-employed whilst Brock and Evans (1986) ﬁnd the reverse in the U.S..
More evidence reported by Clark and Drinkwater (2000), indicates higher
rates of self-employment amongst ethnic minorities in England and Wales.
In addition, it appears to be the case that ethnic enclaves provide a market
for self-employed immigrants catering for individuals from the same ethnic
background (Le 1999).
The role of educational qualiﬁcations has been incorporated into many
empirical studies, being a key determinant of success, or otherwise, in the
labour market. Educational attainment may act as a proxy for ability —
individuals of higher ability may make better managers, which in turn may
enhance their probability of becoming self-employed. Studies reporting a
positive relationship between educational attainment and the probability of
self-employment, include Rees and Shah (1986), Borjas (1986), Borjas and
Bronars (1989) and Evans and Leighton (1989). Alternatively, higher levels
of educational attainment may play a signalling role in the labour market
with high educational qualiﬁcations serving to secure employment in the non
self-employed sector. Evidence supporting an inverse relationship between
higher levels of educational qualiﬁcations and the propensity to become self-
employed include Evans (1989), de Wit and Winden (1989) and Kidd (1993).
In summary, the evidence regarding the relationship between education and
the propensity to become self-employed remains inconclusive.
Another important labour market inﬂuence is local labour market condi-
tions — if self-employment essentially provides a step out of unemployment,
we might expect to see a higher rate of self-employment in areas charac-
terised by relatively high unemployment. Evans and Leighton (1989), report
6evidence supporting this view whilst Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1990) ﬁnd
inconclusive evidence. This eﬀect may be evidence by variables pertaining to
region of residence and industry/sector of employment, in that they capture
the eﬀects of local and general labour market conditions.
Finally, Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998) and Blanchﬂower and Oswald
(1990), argue that the psychological factors associated with entrepreneurial
drive play a key role in the propensity to become self-employed. Evans and
Leighton (1989) focus on one such psychological factor — willingness to be in
charge of one’s own destiny — and ﬁnd that this is positively correlated with
self-employment propensity.
A related point concerns an individual’s preference for hours of work. In
general, ﬁxed wage employment entails accepting the working week dictated
by the employer (although in some cases an employee may be able to exercise
some discretion, albeit within the parameters speciﬁed by the employer, for
example “ﬂexi-time” schemes). In contrast, the self-employee can determine
the number of hours of work, presumably to satisfy their entrepreneurial
drive, thereby exerting more control over his/her destiny.
To summarise, the general approach adopted to proﬁle the self-employed
entails specifying a Probit or Logit model to predict the probability of self-
employment relative to ﬁxed wage employment, with a set of explanatory
variables representing a mixture of labour supply (such as family status) and
demand (such as sector of employment) inﬂuences. We extend the existing
literature by allowing for three types of employment contract namely; ﬁxed
wage employment, performance related pay and self-employment. The inclu-
s i o no ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t ec a t e g o r ya l l o w sf o rt h ef a c tt h a t ,i nr e a l i t y ,t h ec h o i c e
7between self-employment and non self-employment, is not as stark as that de-
picted in the existing literature — intermediate contracts do exist which have
characteristics of both ﬁxed wage employment and self-employment. In addi-
tion, the existing literature does not distinguish between the supply side and
demand side inﬂuences despite the fact that the labour demand inﬂuences
may lead to contract speciﬁce ﬀects, which should be modelled explicitly, and
hence diﬀerently, to individual heterogeneity. In the next section, we suggest
an appropriate econometric model that allows for such considerations.
3T h e E c o n o m e t r i c M o d e l
3.1 The DOGEV Model
A new discrete model recently proposed by Fry and Harris (2002) forms the
basis for the econometric analysis. Known as the DOGEV model, it is based
upon separate, independent, generalisations of the Logit model for multi-
ple outcomes. One of the generalisations embodies the OGEV probabilities
(Small 1987), which allow for ordering in the data and correlations of al-
ternatives in close vicinity. This is important as it is our contention that
employment contract types can be naturally ranked according to the asso-
ciated earnings uncertainty, from self-employment at one extreme to ﬁxed
wage employment at the other. Moreover, it is likely that neighbouring al-
ternatives will indeed be correlated - using the same dataset as that used in
this paper, Brown, Farrell, Harris, and Sessions (2002) ﬁnd strong evidence
of ordering across types of employment.
The second extension which the DOGEV model embodies, is the Dogit
8model of Gaudry and Dagenais (1979). This expands on Logit probabili-
ties by the introduction of additional choice-speciﬁc parameters, θj.T h e
interpretation of these parameters varies across application, but in general
they can be regarded as heterogeneity of the alternative itself, as opposed
to observed individual heterogeneity. In addition, they may also represent
unobserved individual heterogeneity which is common to individuals within
a chosen alternative. For example, if the majority of individuals choosing a
particular employment type, work a similar number of hours and the num-
ber of hours worked is a missing variable in the data set, the θ parameter for
this particular outcome will embody the eﬀect of this variable. Once more,
such an extension appears very appropriate with regard to modelling types of
employment contract. For example, it is quite likely that certain individuals
will be captive to particular types of employment given the known labour
market rigidities (for example, the possibility of discrimination).
It is intuitive in this context to consider the choice-set generation set-up
of Manski (1977). Speciﬁcally, in the Dogit model an individual is assumed
to be either captive to one of the J outcomes (here employment contract
type) or chooses freely from the full choice set. Therefore, the available
choice set faced by individual i, Bi = B ∀i, comprises J +1sets, J single
outcome “captivity sets” and one set comprising all J outcomes from which
“free choice” is (subsequently) exercised by the individual. The choice set
generation process itself can be represented as a random utility maximisation
model with utilities given by
U
(1)
ik = Wik + ηik,i =1 ,...,n; k =1 ,...,J+1 . (1)
9Under the assumptions that: ηik are independently and identically dis-
tributed as a Type 1 Extreme Value variate; Wik =l o g ( θk);a n dt h en o r -
malisation that WiJ+1 =0 , the probability of individual i c h o o s i n gas i n g l e














For the outcome selection process, the probability that an individual
chooses the speciﬁed outcome j from a single outcome choice set is one. The
probability that an individual chooses the speciﬁed outcome j from the full
choice set is, in the second stage, derived from the standard random utility
maximisation model, RUM (Fry, Brooks, Comley, and Zhang 1993), of
U
(2)
ij = Vij + εij (4)
where U
(2)
ij is the utility that individual i gains from alternative j in this sec-
ond stage, and Vij and εij are, respectively, the non-stochastic and stochastic




and under the assumption that the εij independently follow a Type 1 Extreme
Value distribution, the resulting probabilities have the standard Logit form





















ij are the simple Logit probabilities for multiple outcomes.
Fry and Harris (2002) suggest utilising this basic set-up, but to replace










(exp(ρ−1Vi,j−1)+e x p( ρ−1Vij))
ρ−1
+( e x p( ρ−1Vij)+e x p( ρ−1Vi,j+1))
ρ−1i
,
where the parameter ρ accounts for any ordering/correlation in the data.
Akin to a moving average process, the OGEV (and hence DOGEV)
model(s) account for ordering in the data by allowing a correlation between
alternatives in close proximity, which decreases the further are the two al-
ternatives apart. Although ρ is not strictly a correlation coeﬃcient - which
has no closed form expression in these models (Small 1987) - it is inversely
related to this such that when ρ =1 , the OGEV (DOGEV) model collapses
to the Logit (Dogit) one.

















This speciﬁcation is convenient in that simple parameter restriction tests
of ρ =1and θ = 0, are tests against the nested sub-models of Dogit and
11OGEV (and jointly, Logit), respectively. Such parameter restrictions can be
easily tested for using usual testing paradigms.
Using the indicator function dij where
dij =
½
1 if individual i chooses alternative j
0 otherwise
the parameters of the model are now estimated using the maximum likelihood

















ij being given by equation (8).
3.2 The Parameterised DOGEV Model
In a model of employment contracts, a relatively standard set of observed in-
dividual characteristics are likely to directly aﬀect the (second-stage) utilities
of the individual via the index functions described in equations (5) and (4).
Labour market rigidities, and in particular demand side constraints, insti-
gate the likely captivity of individuals to particular types of employment, as
stated above. However, an important question, is are these captivity eﬀects
constant across individuals? In other words, is there heterogeneity of the
various types of employment, that will vary in its eﬀect across individuals?
For example, consider hours worked. Certain individuals are likely to have a
penchant for a particular length of working week. However, such divergences
in hours worked are likely to be speciﬁc to particular types of employment
and predominantly controlled (or set) by the employers - for example ﬁxed
wage contracts are more likely to be associated with the “standard” working
week.
12Therefore, to allow for this, here we follow Harris, Fry, and Webster (2002)
by considering an important extension to the basic DOGEV model. The
so-called “Parameterised” DOGEV model, allows the captivity parameters
θ,t ov a r yb yo b s e r v e df a c t o r sz which characterize employment contract
heterogeneity (or demand side eﬀects), such that






where the use of the exponential transformation ensures non-negativity of the
θ parameters, required for the probabilities of equation (8) to be properly
deﬁned (Gaudry and Dagenais 1979). Such a generalisation appears appro-
priate in a model explaining observed types of employment contracts, as it
is possible to identify contract speciﬁcf a c t o r sthat are likely to impact on
the type of employment contract an individual holds. We return to these in
Section 5.
4T h e D a t a
Our data is drawn from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for the UK,
which is a nationally representative survey that has been conducted on an
annual basis since 1957. Some 10,000 households are selected each year
and the average response rate is approximately 70%. The main aim of the
survey is to provide a reliable source of information on household expenditure,
income and other aspects of household ﬁnances.
We use pooled data from the 1997/98, 1998/99 and 1999/00 surveys.
Our sub-sample comprises of working adults aged between 18 and 65 who
are either self-employed, employed under a ﬁxed wage contract or on a con-
13Table 1: Distribution of the Sample by Employment Contract
Self-employed PRP Fixed Wage Total
Number % Number % Number % Number %
1287 9.4% 3,623 26.5% 8,765 64.1% 13,675 100%
tract characterized by a bonus scheme thereby introducing an element of
PRP. The bonus schemes include: Christmas bonuses; productivity bonuses;
proﬁt related bonuses; loyalty bonuses; dividends; incentive schemes and
performance/sales bonuses. Clearly the nature of these bonuses is somewhat
diverse and as such may create diﬀerent incentive mechanisms in the work-
place. For simplicity we will treat those employed on PRP contracts as a
homogeneous group.
S a m p l es t a t i s t i c sa r es e to u ti nT a b l e s1-3 . I ti sa p p a r e n tf r o mT a b l e
1t h a tﬁxed wage contracts are the dominant form of employment (64.1%)
and self-employment (9.41%) is the least common.2 Table 2 shows there are
interesting diﬀerences in the incidence of employment type across individual
characteristics. For example, men are relatively more likely to hold employ-
ment contracts associated with earnings uncertainty - self-employment. The
incidence of self-employment is higher amongst married relative to single,
separated, divorced and widowed, respondents. This may reﬂect a form of
risk pooling with married people being attracted to self-employment because
they can oﬀset some income risk with other household members (for a full
discussion of these issues see Brown, Farrell, and Sessions (2001) and Schiller
and Crewson (1997)). With respect to ethnicity, PRP contracts are more
2The 9.4% self-employment ﬁgure ties in closely with that stated earlier of 9% for the
U.K. suggesting that we have a representative working sample of the working population.
14heavily concentrated among whites. Whilst the incidence of self-employment
is low amongst blacks, the incidence of self-employment is relatively high
among Asians, tying in with the ﬁndings of (Borooah and Hart 1999).3
One might also hypothesize that both the number and the age of children
will aﬀect a parent’s willingness to become self-employed. We therefore con-
sider the number of pre-school and school-age children in the household and
ﬁnd that whilst the former are distributed relatively evenly across the three
types of employment, the latter are highest amongst self-employed workers.
This may reﬂect the fact that self-employed workers are, on average, older
than workers on PRP or ﬁxed wage contracts.
The age proﬁle of individuals employed on PRP contracts appears to be
“n−shaped”. This may be due to that fact that such contracts have been
more widely introduced over the last decade and, as such, may be reﬂecting a
cohort, rather than an age, eﬀect. The age proﬁle of individuals on ﬁxed wage
contracts is skewed towards the youngest age group (i.e., those aged less than
twenty), suggesting that the earnings uncertainty associated with PRP and
self-employment may be prohibitively high for individuals with little labour
market experience. In addition, they are less likely to have acquired the
necessary ﬁnancial capital to start a business. The proportion of individuals
in self-employment increases with age, a ﬁnding that is consistent with the
hypothesis that older, displaced workers might turn to self-employment given
their relatively low probability of re-employment. It might also reﬂect the
ability of older workers to acquire the necessary start-up capital for, and to
3Small eﬀective sample sizes, prohibit separate identiﬁcation of all ethnic minority
eﬀects in the econometric analysis.
15Table 2: Contract Type by Individual Characteristics
Self-employed PRP Fixed Wage
Gender
Males 11.77 28.19 60.04
Females 4.67 23.07 72.26
Family Status
Single 4.15 26.18 69.67
Married/cohabit 10.28 26.79 62.39
Separated/widowed/divorced 9.44 24.50 66.06
Pre-school Children∗ 0.22 0.23 0.18
School-Age Children∗ 0.75 0.47 0.52
Ethnicity
White 9.28 26.78 63.94
Black 6.04 19.23 74.73
Asian 15.17 20.40 64.43
Age
17<Age<19 1.74 15.12 83.14
20<Age<29 3.55 28.70 67.75
30<Age<39 8.84 29.98 61.18
40<Age<49 11.92 24.34 63.74
Age>50 14.17 23.39 63.44
Education Level
Less than GCSE 14.06 22.36 63.58
GCSE 9.29 26.94 63.77
Further Education 7.38 28.48 64.14
Higher Education 7.78 27.28 64.94
Housing Tenure
Rented- local authority 6.11 22.17 71.72
Rented - private 9.82 22.16 68.02
Mortgaged 9.02 28.44 62.54
Owned 13.89 22.20 68.92
Hours of work∗ 50.77 39.67 39.92
Note: Numbers are expressed as a percentage of the total number of individuals within
the three types of employment for each individual characteristic, except for those
denoted by * which represent the average for each types of employment
16better absorb the income uncertainty associated with, self-employment, on
account of their longer accumulation of wealth.
Individuals in self-employment have relatively few formal qualiﬁcations.
PRP contracts, on the other hand, are concentrated amongst those with for-
m a ls c h o o lq u a l i ﬁcations and higher, whilst individuals holding ﬁxed wage
contracts are relatively evenly spread across all levels of schooling. It would
appear that whilst educational attainment plays an important role in explain-
ing the probability of holding PRP contacts or being self-employed, it may
not be so important in explaining why individuals hold ﬁxed wage contracts.
In relation to housing tenure, ﬁxed wage employees are most likely to be
found living in local authority housing, whilst the self-employed are more
likely to own their homes outright and PRP workers are most likely to live in
homes that are mortgaged. This may reﬂect the fact that housing equity is
often used as collateral to secure loans necessary to start up a small business.
Finally, in terms of employer determined aspects of employment contracts,
we can see that self-employed individuals have a much longer working week
than those employed under ﬁxed wage or PRP contracts. This is consistent
with the known labour market rigidities in terms of hours of work. Fixed
wage and PRP employees are not free to determine the number of hours that
they work. Hours of work are usually a contractually speciﬁed aspect of the
employment contract, although overtime may be available. We observe ﬁxed
wage and PRP workers to have a standard working week of approximately 40
hours, whilst the self-employed are observed to have a much longer working
week of around 50 hours (and also with a much higher standard deviation).
Table 3 shows the relationship between contract types and employment
17Table 3: Contract Type by Employment Sector
Fixed Wage PRP Self-employed Total
Sample sizes
Retail 1917 1043 451 3411
Manufacturing 2990 1553 522 5065
Services/public 3858 1027 314 5199
Total 8765 3623 1287 13675
Percentages
Retail 56 31 13 100
Manufacturing 59 31 10 100
Services/public 74 20 6 100
sector - another supply side factor important in determining observed em-
ployment contract outcomes, namely the sector of employment. That is,
employment in a given sector captures an element of employment contract
heterogeneity. The table shows that ﬁxed wage contracts are the dominant
type of employment across all three (broad) sectors of the economy. How-
ever there are interesting diﬀerences regarding the frequency of PRP and
self-employment across the sectors. Contracts other than ﬁxed wages are
very rare within the service sector and the self employed are more common
in the retail and manufacturing sectors, both of which also have a high fre-
quency of PRP.
5T h e R e s u l t s
The results are set out in Tables 4 and 5 below. For comparison purposes, we
also report results from multinomial Logit estimations, along with those from
the Parameterised DOGEV. As discussed in Section 2 the standard approach
to modelling the determinants of self-employment is to undertake a Logit or
18Probit analysis where variables such as the sector the individual works in
are included as standard regressors.4 We argue here that these are demand
side factors which reﬂect employment contract heterogeneity and should be
modelled explicitly, and separately, to individual heterogeneity. Contract
heterogeneity implies that individuals may be captive to a particular contract
type irrespective of their personal characteristics. The instruments we use
to control for employment type heterogeneity are: the sector of employment;
hours of work; and ethnic origin.
It is clear that these variables capture demand side aspects. That is,
certain sectors are more suited to diﬀerent types of employment contracts.
Where large economies of scale and/or large sunk costs exist, we would not
expect to ﬁnd a high prevalence of self-employed workers. Similarly the
services/public sector will logically be dominated by ﬁxed wage contracts.
Employment contracts will therefore be a function of the sector that the
individual works in. Thus, in addition to observed personal characteristics,
individuals employed in diﬀerent sectors are likely to be captive, to varying
extents, to particular employment types.
Hours of work are usually contractually speciﬁed and hours inﬂexibility
is a well documented labour market rigidity. Within fairly narrow bands,
employees cannot, generally, freely choose the number of hours they wish to
work (although some ﬂexibility is generated by the availability of overtime
and ﬂexi-time, but this too is employer driven and controlled). There is
much evidence which suggests that self-employment requires working longer
4An Ordered Probit model is inappropriate here, as our descriptive statistics above
clearly suggest the coeﬃcient vector ought not to be restricted to be equivalent across
outcomes.
19hours than other types of employment. Thus employment types are het-
erogeneous in terms of the number of hours they imply. An individuals
ability/willingness to supply labour will therefore make then captive to par-
ticular contract types. Those unable/unwilling to work long hours are less
likely to be observed to be self-employed.5
Finally, as suggested in the literature, we argue that employer based dis-
crimination may push ethnic minorities into self-employment and thus em-
ployment contracts may be heterogeneous in terms of ethnic groups. How-
ever, it is important to note that, in this respect, this is a clear demand side
factor which will impact on the incidence of self-employment among ethnic
minority groups.
Including demand side variables as standard regressors does not take
into consideration their true impact in terms of tying workers to particu-
lar types of employment. We argue this leads to misspeciﬁcation and po-
tentially erroneous inference. In order to understand the contribution of
modelling outcome heterogeneity makes to our understanding of who are
the self-employed?, we present a comparison of the Parameterised DOGEV
results with the standard multinomial Logit speciﬁcation.
Prior to discussing the estimated coeﬃcients on the explanatory variables
we will present a comparison of the two models. Table 1 shows the sample
proportions across types of employment and the within-sample predicted pro-
portions from the multinomial Logit and the Parameterised DOGEV models.
5The data indicates that there is a larger variance of hours worked amongst the self-
employed. However, for any self-employed individual this does not necessarly imply a high
variance across average weekly hours worked. Therefore these data can inform us about
an individual’s preference for abolute hours, and not variance of such.
20Table 4: Multinomial Logit Estimates
Reference Category: Fixed Wage Contracts
PRP Contract Self-Employed
Variable Coef Coef
Constant -1.981 (0.32) ∗∗ -10.310 (0.57) ∗∗
Demographic
Male 0.353 (0.05) ∗∗ 0.453 (0.09) ∗∗
Age 0.915 (0.15) ∗∗ 1.388 (0.27) ∗∗
Age squared -0.122 (0.02) ∗∗ -0.124 (0.03) ∗∗
Married 0.088 (0.06) 0.236 (0.13) *
Separated/widowed/divorced 0.133 (0.10) 0.217 (0.17)
Pre school children 0.071 (0.04) 0.181 (0.07) ∗∗
School age children -0.147 (0.03) ∗∗ 0.156 (0.04) ∗∗
Education
GCSE 0.097 (0.07) -0.061 (0.09)
Further Education 0.238 (0.07) ∗∗ -0.093 (0.11)
Higher Education 0.131 (0.07) ∗ -0.182 (0.11)
Housing Tenure
Rented private -0.021 (0.10) 0.752 (0.18) ∗∗
Mortgaged 0.284 (0.07) ∗∗ 0.575 (0.14) ∗∗
Owned 0.124 (0.09) 0.956 (0.16) ∗∗
Year of Survey
1998/99 -0.263 (0.05) ∗∗ -0.323 (0.08) ∗∗
1997/98 -0.213 (0.05) ∗∗ -0.218 (0.08) ∗∗
Household Income 0.286 (0.04) ∗∗ 0.019 (0.07)
Region
Wales -0.146 (0.11) -0.043 (0.17)
Scotland -0.070 (0.13) 0.197 (0.20)
North England -0.021 (0.08) -0.041 (0.13)
Midlands -0.168 (0.08) ∗∗ -0.135 (0.13)
South England 0.048 (0.05) -0.250 (0.09) ∗∗
Industry and hours of work
Manufacturing -0.085 (0.05) -0.248 (0.08) ∗∗
Services/public -0.753 (0.05) ∗∗ -0.953 (0.09) ∗∗
Hours of work -0.191 (0.04) ∗∗ 0.995 (0.03) ∗∗
Non-white -0.266 (0.11) ∗∗ 0.284 (0.16) ∗
Number of Observations 13675
Log Likelihood -10500
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗
and ∗ signiﬁcant at 5 and 10% level, respectively
(two-sided).
21Table 5: Parameterised DOGEV Estimates
PRP Contract Self-Employed
Variable Coef Coef
Constant -3.360 (1.05) ∗∗ -8.588 (1.83) ∗∗
Male 0.675 (0.19) ∗∗ 0.406 (0.28)
Age 1.276 (0.51) ∗∗ 2.841 (0.79) ∗∗
Age squared -0.184 (0.07) ∗∗ -0.264 (0.09) ∗∗
Married 0.153 (0.16) 1.024 (0.34) ∗∗
Separated/widowed/divorced 0.092 (0.26) 0.930 (0.42) ∗∗
Pre school children -0.123 (0.07) 0.272 (0.17)
School age children 0.437 (0.18) ∗ 0.237 (0.10) ∗∗
Education
GCSE -0.323 (0.18) ∗ -0.063 (0.22)
Further Education -0.025 (0.17) -0.128 (0.28)
Higher Education -0.125 (0.17) 0.080 (0.28)
Housing Tenure
Rented private -0.216 (0.27) 1.533 (0.47) ∗∗
Mortgaged 0.506 (0.21) ∗∗ 1.781 (0.39) ∗∗
Owned 0.469 (0.26) ∗ 2.502 (0.48) ∗∗
Year of Survey
1998/99 -0.413 (0.15) ∗∗ -0.574 (0.20) ∗∗
1997/98 -0.397 (0.15) ∗∗ -0.363 (0.20) ∗
Household Income 0.437 (0.18) ∗∗ -4.719 (1.04) ∗∗
Region
Wales -0.668 (0.34) ∗ -0.881 (0.49)
Scotland -0.074 (0.30) 0.658 (0.54)
North England -0.151 (0.19) -0.158 (0.27)
Midlands -0.433 (0.24) ∗ -0.432 (0.31)
South England -0.007 (0.13) -1.009 (0.31)
Captivity Parameters
Fixed Wage
Constant 11.860 (0.75) ∗∗
Manufacturing -0.040 (0.16)
Services 0.387 (0.20) ∗∗
Hours of work -2.720 (0.19) ∗∗
Non-white 0.354 (0.29)
PRP
Constant 14.120 (0.89) ∗∗
Manufacturing -0.096 (0.17)
Services -0.473 (0.20) ∗∗
Hours of work -3.456 (0.23) ∗∗
Non-white -0.012 (0.30)
Self-Employed
Constant -2.777 (0.36) ∗∗
Manufacturing -0.187 (0.15)
Services -0.713 (0.17) ∗∗
Hours of work 0.348 (0.06) ∗∗
Non-white 0.706 (0.26) ∗∗
ρ 0.562 (0.27) ∗∗
Number of Observations 13675
Log Likelihood -10350
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗
and ∗ signiﬁcant at 5 and 10% level, respectively
(two-sided).
22Table 6: Sample proportions and predicted outcomes
Fixed wage PRP Self-employed Correct
Sample 0.641 0.265 0.094
Multinomial Logit 0.945 0.016 0.039 0.65
Parameterised DOGEV 0.938 0.011 0.051 0.66
We can see that both speciﬁcations over predict the dominant outcome, ﬁxed
wages. However, as was our contention, the Parameterised DOGEV model
does much better at predicting outcomes within the self-employed category
(although marginally worse in the PRP one).6 Indeed, the poor ability of the
multinomial Logit to predict outside of the dominant category is worrying.
Clearly, explicitly accounting for employment contract heterogeneity greatly
increases our ability to understand observed employment outcomes. In terms
of predictive power the Parameterised DOGEV model is better, predicting
66% of observations correctly; compared to 65% for the multinomial Logit
speciﬁcation. However the predictive capacity of the models is misleading
given the dominance of ﬁxed wage contracts in the data - a naïve model pre-
dicting ﬁxed wage employment for the entire sample would correctly predict
64% of the observations! A better criterion for judging the performance of the
models is their ability to predict outcomes outside of the dominant category
and the Parameterised DOGEV clearly does better than the multinomial
Logit in this respect, especially with regard to self-employment.
To further consider the within-sample prediction accuracy of the Para-
meterised DOGEV model Table 7 presents a simulated hit and miss table. A
6Neither models predict the PRP category particularly well. One suspects that this
is due to a paucity of variables pertaining to the workplace. Datasets containing such
variables are workplace orientated and, by deﬁnition, will not include the self-employed.
However, it is an important intermediate category as it allows, for instance, us to identify
earnings’ uncertainty.
23c o m m o nm e a s u r eo fp r e d i c t i v ea c c u r a c yi nd i s c r e t ec h o i c em o d e l si st h e“ h i t -
miss” table. The predictions underlying hit-miss tables are given by assigning
individuals the outcome associated with their highest predicted probability
across the alternatives and then comparing this to the observed outcome. As
is generally the case with discrete choice models (Duncan and Harris 2002)
both of these models tended to over predict the most frequently chosen al-
ternative (as noted above). This is because construction of traditional hit
and miss tables implicitly ignores the stochastic elements of the underlying
economic model. Therefore we present simulated hit and miss tables where
we explicitly take into account both the stochastic and non-stochastic el-
ements of the underlying utility function (over 1,000 random draws). For
comparison purposes, the case of a random assignment of individuals types
of employment according to observed sample proportions is also presented.
The Parameterised DOGEV quite clearly predicts better than simple random
assignment. So, it appears that accounting for potential captivity within a
particular type of employment (and so modelling it explicitly as opposed to
simply including these variables as standard regressors in a multinomial Logit
framework), is particularly important in understanding why individuals are
observed in particular types of employment.
Figure 1 further illustrates the predictive power of the Parameterised
DOGEV model by graphing: the actual sample proportions by type of em-
ployment; the average predicted probability across the individuals for each
outcome; total probabilities predicted at the sample means of the explana-
tory variables; and the amount of the latter accounted for by the captivity
24Table 7: Hit and Miss Tables
RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
Predicted
Actual Fixed wage PRP Self-employed Total
Fixed wage 5618 2322 825 8765
PRP 2322 960 341 3623
Self-employed 825 341 121 1287
Total 8765 3623 1287 13675
PARAMETERISED DOGEV SIMULATED
Predicted
Actual Fixed wage PRP Self-employed Total
Fixed wage 5837 2296 632 8765
PRP 2301 1069 253 3623
Self-employed 624 263 400 1287
Total 8762 3628 1285 13675
within each employment outcome.7 Under these two tests of predictive power
we can see the model clearly performs well. The average probability of be-
ing in each employment contract accurately matches the sample proportions.
Whilst calculating the predicted probabilities at the sample means of the
v a r i a b l e sd o e ss l i g h t l yo v e rp r e d i c tt h en u m b e ro fﬁxed wage employees and
slightly under predict the number of PRP and self-employed workers, the
orders of magnitude are small. Moreover, the diagram illustrates the sub-
stantial contribution made to the total probabilities arising from the demand
side (or captivity) factors.
Another short fall of the multinomial Logit speciﬁcation is the fact that
it can’t account for the proposed presence of ordering in the alternatives
(according to earnings’ uncertainty). The Parameterised DOGEV, on the
7This diﬀers from Table 1 which is based on observed individual characteristics as
opposed to sample means.
25Figure 1: Sample Proportions; Predicted Probabilities - average and at sam-
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other hand, does. A simple test for the null hypothesis of no ordering, is
undertaken as a test of ρ =1 . We clearly reject the null, conﬁrming our
hypothesis that employment contracts are ordered according to their degree
of earnings uncertainty, and therefore it is important in modelling observed
type of employment, to account for this. Note that ρ is statistically signif-
icantly diﬀerent from 0 and 1 (at the 95% level). Ignoring the ordering in
our data would therefore result in misspeciﬁcation and erroneous potentially
inferences. Note also, that this conﬁrms previous results of Brown, Farrell,
Harris, and Sessions (2002) and Fry and Harris (2002).
In terms of explanatory variables, a comparison of the multinomial Logit
estimates against the Parameterised DOGEV estimates shows a fairly con-
sistent story, although the signiﬁcance of some variables varies across the
speciﬁcations. One should, however, note the high degree of signiﬁcance of
26the captivity parameters in the Parameterised DOGEV model suggesting
that they are controlling for important demand side factors and thus do cap-
ture employment contract heterogeneity. This is also reﬂe c t e di nt h el a r g e
contribution they make to the total probability of being in any employment
class (as is highlighted by the diagrams above and below). A simple like-
lihood ratio test of the Parameterised DOGEV model against the DOGEV
speciﬁcation showed that the parameterisation of the captivity terms, ac-
cording to the variables discussed above does make a signiﬁcant contribution
to the likelihood function. Hence we will concentrate the discussion of the
results on the Parameterised DOGEV speciﬁcation.
Given the complexity of the implicit marginal eﬀects of the Parameterised
DOGEV model and, for reasons of clarity, we present the implied probabili-
ties for diﬀerent realisations of our explanatory variables. Speciﬁcally, we will
consider the impact of individual heterogeneity in terms of age and housing
tenure (two variables that past studies have found signiﬁcant in predicting
the incidence of self-employment) and of contract heterogeneity in terms of
employment sector, hours of work and ethnicity - setting all other variables
to their sample means.
The diagrams have been constructed so that one can distinguish the con-
tribution to the total probabilities generated by the individual and contract
speciﬁch e t e r o g e n e i t y . N o t et h a ta sw ec h a n g ex (individual heterogeneity
variables) total probabilities change via equations (5) and (8), although the
captivity probabilities are unaltered. On the other hand, when we change z
(contract heterogeneity variables), captive probabilities are directly aﬀected
via equations (9) and (8), but also the non-captive ones via a scale factor
27implied by these equations. That is, changes in x change the total probabil-
ities through the impact on POGEV
ij and hence aﬀect only the second term of
equation (8). Whilst changes in z inﬂuence θj and so aﬀect both terms in
(8): the ﬁrst term directly and the second term via a scale factor.
Regarding age, we ﬁnd that individual heterogeneity plays almost no
role in the probability of being self-employed when young, but becomes in-
creasingly important for workers aged 40 plus. This is consistent with the
literature that concludes that age is positively related to the propensity to
become self-employed. This ﬁnding is consistent with any of the following
hypotheses: i) older workers are “pushed” into self-employment as a result
of a lack of other employment opportunities in later life, ii) older individu-
als may becomes self-employed once they have accumulated suﬃcient human
capital or, iii) older individuals have acquired the necessary and ﬁnancial
capital to become self-employed (Le 1999).
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Secondly, we graph the predicted probabilities conditional on housing
tenure (see Figure 3). We can see that these ﬁndings are consistent with the
hypothesis that capital/asset accumulation allows entry into self-employment,
given that housing equity is a common source of loans security. Home owner-
ship is positively associated with self-employment, whilst renting is positively
associated with ﬁxed wage employment.8
Turning to the results regarding the impact of demand side eﬀects in terms
of their ability to capture workers within particular types of employment, we
ﬁnd that ﬁxed wage workers are most likely to be found in the service/public
sector and the increased probability is largely due to the captivity parameters.
PRP and self-employment in contrast are least likely to be found in this sector
(see Figure 4).
8LA renting in Figure 3 refers to Local Authority rented homes - government provided
housing.
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In relation to the number of hours worked, we ﬁnd the largest degree
of variation in the contribution of the individual and contract heterogene-
ity parameters across the range of possible hours worked and the types of
contracts. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
Fixed wage workers are most likely to be observed working a standard
working week (approximately 40 hours), PRP workers have a slightly shorter
working week (35 hours per week) and the self-employed appear to have
longer working hours (the probability of being self-employed increases as
hours increases). Captivity variables dominate the probability of being em-
ployed on a ﬁxed wage contract for low hours of work, however, their con-
tribution to the total probability diminishes rapidly as the number of hours
worked increases. The same pattern is observed for those employed un-
der PRP contracts; whilst the converse is true for the self-employed. The
self-employed are much more likely to be observed working long hours and
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logically the contract heterogeneity parameters dominate this probability.
Figure 6 shows how employment type varies with ethnic origin. There
have been a number of studies that have shown that ethnic minorities have
a higher probability to be self-employed (see, Clark and Drinkwater 2000,
Brock and Evans 1986), and this ﬁnding is reﬂected in our results. The dia-
gram shows that non-whites are much more likely to be self-employed than
the other ethnic groups, Borooah and Hart (1999) ﬁnd similar evidence. In
contrast, contract heterogeneity plays a large role in determining the prob-
ability of being a ﬁxed wage worker for whites. The signiﬁcance of ethnic
origin as a captivity parameter is consistent with the hypothesis that labour
market discrimination pushes non-whites into self-employment.
In summary, our results show that demand side factors are important de-
terminants of the type of employment contract an individual holds. Whilst
individual heterogeneity explains some of the story, demand side factors are


























highly inﬂuential. Previous literature has concentrated on explaining who the
self-employed are in terms of individual heterogeneity, our results suggests
that demand side factors (such as labour market rigidities and discrimina-
tion) also play an important role in explaining self-employment. Moreover,
simply including demand side variables as standard regressors in a model of
individual heterogeneity leads to poorer predictive power when compared to
a speciﬁcation that explicitly and simultaneously controls for the captivity
impact of the demand side factors.
6 Conclusions
Economists have in general found it hard to predict who the self employed are
based on models of individual heterogeneity. Our results suggest that this is
not surprising. Whilst individual characteristics are important identiﬁers of
employment contracts, aspects of contract speciﬁc heterogeneity also play a
32very important role. We have shown that modelling outcome heterogeneity
as individual heterogeneity leads to poor predictions when compared to a
model that allows us to separate out the eﬀects of individual and outcome
heterogeneity. Moreover, our results suggest that the existing literature has
drawn conclusions from potentially misspeciﬁed models.
We present a model where individual heterogeneity represents labour sup-
ply side characteristics and contract heterogeneity represents supply side
characteristics. We argue that workers are captive to certain types of employ-
ment as a result of the sector in which they work, the number of hours that
they work and their ethnic origin. We have shown that the self-employed are
captive to self-employment due to their ethnicity, by some strong preference
to work longer hours and as a result of the sector they work in. Moreover,
we show that the probabilities of being in any particular employment type
are heavily driven by supply side factors. Our results concerning individual
heterogeneity are consistent with the existing literature in as much as the
self-employed are more likely to be older and have housing equity. Addi-
tionally we have conﬁrmed previous results in the literature conﬁrming that
types of employment are ranked in order of earnings uncertainty.
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